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INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE-NEBRASKA'S
NEW FELONY'
I.

INTRODUCTION

Industrial research is the backbone of this country's advanced
economy. Tomorrow's advancement in industrial strength depends directly upon the success of today's research. In the United
States alone, industry will spend eighteen billion dollars on research this year. 2 Although the value of this research is unlimited, many companies will never realize the full benefit of their
outlay of time, effort and capital because of industrial espionage.
It is estimated that losses in industrial research through espionage
will reach two billion dollars annually. 3
1

This bill was introduced as L.B. 867 and will be cited as Nzn. REv.
STAT. §§ 28-548.01-.03 (Supp. 1965).
Sec. 1. As used in this act, unless the context otherwise requires:
1. Article shall mean any object, material, device or substance or
copy thereof, including any writing, record, recording, drawing, sample,
specimen, phototype, model, photograph, micro-organism, blueprint or
map;
2. Representing shall mean describing, depicting, containing, constituting, reflecting or recording;
3. Trade secret shall mean the whole or any portion or phrase of
any scientific or technical information, design, process, procedure, formula or improvement which is secret and of value; and a trade secret
shall be presumed to be secret when the owner thereof takes measures
to prevent it from becoming available to persons other than those
selected by the owner to have access thereto for limited purposes; and
4. Copy shall mean any facsimile, replica, photograph or other

reproduction of an article, and any note, drawing or sketch made of
or from an article.

2

Sec. 2. Any person who, with intent to deprive or withhold from
the owner thereof the control of a trade secret, or with an intent to
appropriate a trade secret to his own use or to the use of another
(1) steals or embezzles an article representing a trade secret or
(2) without authority makes or causes to be made a copy of an
article representing a trade secret, shall be guilty of a felony and shall,
upon conviction thereof, be punished by a fine of not less than one
thousand dollars, nor more than five thousand dollars, or by imprisonment in the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex for not less
than one year nor more than seven years, or by both such fine and
imprisonment.
Sec. 3. In a prosecution for a violation of the provisions of this
act it shall be no defense that the person so charged returned or
intended to return the article so stolen, embezzled or copied.
Hearings before the Banking, Commerce and Insurance Committee on

L.B. 867, 75th Neb. Leg. Sess. 4-26 (1965) [hereinafter cited as 1965
Hearings.]
3 Ibid.

LEGISLATIVE NOTE
The theft of trade secrets4 is not a new problem in this country. One of the first American cases involving trade secrets was
Peabody v. Norfolk, 5 where the court held:
If he invents or discovers, and keeps secret, a process of manufacture, whether a proper subject for a patent or not, he has not
indeed an exclusive right to it as against the public, or against
those who in good faith acquire knowledge of it; but he has a
property in it, which a court of chancery will protect against one
who in violation of contract and breach of confidence undertakes
to apply it to his own use, or to disclose it to third persons.6
That court went on to hold that injunctive relief would be granted
where there was irreparable injury and an inadequate remedy at
law. American courts have subsequently held that one who has
rightful possession of a trade secret has a property interest in the
subject of that secret.7 The property interest of the inventor or
discoverer is good against all except those who come by the secret
honestly or in good faith." Since the Peabody case, a body of
civil remedies has been developed to redress the injured party.
However, there has been very little development of criminal sanctions specifically directed at trade thefts.
Increasing expenditures for research by American industry 9
will undoubtedly encourage industrial espionage. Because of this
threat, legislators have become aware of the need for effective
criminal sanctions. New York was the first state to pass legislation specifically imposing criminal penalties on those guilty of
industrial espionage. 10 In 1965, the New Jersey Legislature passed
The most frequently quoted and generally accepted definition of "trade
secret" is set out in the RESTATEmENT, TORTS § 757, comment b at 5
(1939): "A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device
or compilation of information which is used in one's business, and
which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it." See also, Macbeth-Evans Glass
Co. v. Schnelbach, 239 Pa. 76, 86 Atl. 688 (1913).
5 98 Mass. 452 (1867).
0 Id. at 458.
7 Stewart v. Hook, 118 Ga. 445, 45 S.E. 369 (1903).
See also Tabor v.
Hoffman, 118 N.Y. 30, 23 N.E. 12 (1889); Ferroline Corp. v. General
Aniline & Film Corp., 207 F.2d 912 (7th Cir. 1953).
8 Stewart v. Hook, 118 Ga. 445, 45 S.E. 369 (1903).
9 25 billion dollars by 1970. Business Week, Oct. 6, 1962, p. 65.
10 N.Y. PEN. LAw, § 1296(4). The amended section reads as follows: "A
person is guilty of grand larceny in the second degree who, under
circumstances not amounting to grand larceny in the first degree, in
any manner specified in this article, steals or unlawfully obtains or
appropriates:
4) "Property of any value consisting of a sample, culture, micro4
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a bill setting out a detailed definition of "trade secret" and prescribing the penalty for trade theft."
In accordance with Nebraska's "open-door policy" toward industry, the Nebraska Legislature passed an act in 1965 which
made the theft of a trade secret a felony. 12 The act is an amalgamation of the New York and New Jersey acts.' 3 The question
toward which this article is directed is whether established civil
remedies, coupled with the added criminal sanctions, afford adequate protection for industrial trade secrets in Nebraska. It is
therefore necessary to briefly discuss the battery of common law
civil remedies before considering the effects of the new legislative
provisions.
II. SUMMARY OF CIVIL REMEDIES
One injured by the dispossession or the deprivation of the
effective use of his trade secret may seek one or more civil rem14
edies to redress his loss. These remedies include injunction,
accounting for profits, 15 return of the stolen materials, 16 destruction of the products of the misappropriated secrets,'1 and suit for
damages.' 8 The injunction was one of the earliest remedies used
to prevent wrongdoers from using illegally obtained trade secrets.' 9 In addition to injunctive relief, an injured party often
organism, specimen, record, recording, document, drawing or any
other article, material, device or substance which constitutes, represents, evidences, reflects, or records a secret scientific or technical
process, invention or formula or any phase or part thereof. A process, invention or formula is secret when it is not, and is not intended
to be available to anyone other than the owner thereof or selected
persons having access thereto for limited purposes with his consent,
and when it accords or may accord the owner an advantage over
competitors or other persons who do not have knowledge or the benefit thereof."
11 N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 2A:119-5.1-.5 (Supp. 1965).
12 NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-548.01-.03 (Supp. 1965).
13 1965 Hearings 4-26.
14

Tabor v. Hoffman, 118 N.Y. 30, 23 N.E. 12 (1889).

15 Vulcan Detinning Co. v. American Can Co., 75 N.J. Eq. 542, 73 Atl.
603 (1909).

16 Pressed Steel Car Co. v. Standard Steel Car Co., 210 Pa. 464, 60 AUt.
4 (1904).
'7 American Bell Tel. Co. v. Kitsell, 35 Fed. 521 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1888).
18 Spiselman v. Rabinowitz, 270 App. Div. 548, 61 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1st. Dep't
1946).
19 STORY, COmmENTARiEs ON EQurrY,

Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452 (1867).

§ 952 (2d ed. 1839); Peabody v.

LEGISLATIVE NOTE
would ask for damages, 20 the measure being not what the plaintiff lost because of the theft, but rather the benefit, profit or
advantage gained by the defendant through the use of the trade
secret.21 The advantage enjoyed by the defendant is measured by
the standard comparison method. 22 In a case involving wrongful
use of an unpatented trade secret by a confidential disclosee, or
other person, the rightful possessor is entitled to an accounting
and recovery of the profits. 23 One of the remedies that may be
requested, but is seldom granted, is destruction of the encroaching
property. 24 The main reason for the court's reluctance in granting such relief is because of the economic waste involved. The
injured party not only has remedies against the person who took
or disclosed his trade secret, but may also sue for damages or exercise other remedies against a third person who knowingly takes
advantage of the misappropriation. 25 There are many complexities that arise from the employee-employer relationship and also
from the employer-employee-third party relationship, which are
26
outside the scope of this article.
In Seismograph Serv. Corp. v. Offshore Raydist, Inc., 135 F. Supp. 342
(E.D. La. 1955) the court said: "Even where it cannot be said that
the parties stand in confidential relations, improper acquisition of
another's business information or trade secrets subjects the perpetrator
to liability in damages. And a court of equity will enjoin the use of
the business information or trade secrets so obtained." Id. at 355.
(Citations Omitted.)
21 International Indus., Inc. v. Warren Petroleum Corp., 248 F.2d 696 (3d
Cir. 1957).
22 This method contemplates the comparison of the cost advantage to the
defendant as a result of the use of the trade secret and the method of
accomplishing the same result which would have been open to the
defendant had he not appropriated the trade secret. Ibid.
23 Becher v. Contoure Lab., 29 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1928), affd,, 279 U.S. 388
(1929).
24 American Bell Tel. Co. v. Kitsell, 35 Fed. 521 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1888).
In
discussing the possibility of destruction the court held: "Where the
court has power to decree, necessarily it has power to carry its decree
into effectual execution; and a court which does not hesitate to enforce
its process by attachment and imprisonment of the person, and by
sequestration of the property of parties, in order to compel obedience,
would not hesitate from any consideration of want of power or propriety to order property to be destroyed which has been created in
defiance of the rights of another, and is being used in further encroachment upon such rights, whenever it might be essential to the
ends of justice that this should be done." Id. at 523.
25 Jerrold-Stephens Co. v. Gustaveson, Inc., 138 F. Supp. 11 (W.D. Mo.
1956); Seismograph Serv. Corp. v. Offshore Raydist, Inc., 135 F. Supp.
342 (E.D. La. 1955); Ferroline Corp. v. General Aniline & Film Corp.,
207 F.2d 912 (7th Cir. 1953).
26 The employer-employee relationship most generally involves either an
20
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It therefore becomes clear that one who has been injured by
the theft of his trade secret is not without remedies to compensate
his loss. The problem, however, goes beyond mere compensation
to whether a wrongdoer should be exonerated by merely apologizing or by returning goods or profits. This is the issue that the
Nebraska Legislature was attempting to resolve when they enacted NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-548.01-.03 (Supp. 1965).
III.

NEBRASKA LEGISLATION-CRIMINAL
SANCTIONS

The prosecution in trade theft cases under the current larceny
statutes is faced with two major problems. First, whether a
property interest in a trade secret is the same as "property" defined in the larceny statutes. 27 Secondly, the necessity of placing
a value on a piece of scrap paper, drawing, photostat, microfilm,
or reproduced blueprint.
In an attempt to avoid prosecution, the accused will claim as
a defense that what was taken was not property, but only a copy
or photostat of the original. It is unclear whether a copy or
photograph of an original is "property" in the same sense that
"property" is defined in the Nebraska statutes. 28
The ascertainment of a monetary value is quite difficult in
many instances. Generally, the only value, which is necessary to
determine the degree of the crime, is the actual value of the paper
itself. 29 The crime then falls within the purview of the petit larexpressed or implied contract of employment. This relationship remains unaffected by the Nebraska act; however, employees fall within
the purview of the statute unrestricted by their status as an employee.
27 NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-506 and § 28-512 (Reissue 1964).
28 Ibid. The Nebraska Supreme Court has not to date been faced with
this decision.

This very likely could be due to the fact that most

charges are for petit larceny and few if any are appealed. However,
in a civil action for the recovery of profits, the court held that an
author did not have a common law property interest in his composition. A property interest would vest in the author when he complied
with the federal copyright laws. State v. State Journal Co., 77 Neb.
752, 110 N.W. 763 (1906).
29 Generally, the trade secret does not have a market value, because it
was being developed for use by the researcher. Most theft statutes
refer to the fair market value when setting value out as the critera
for classification. The Nebraska courts have not clearly stated the
basis used in determining value; however, they appear to use the fair
market value. Spreitzer v. State, 155 Neb. 70, 50 N.W. 2d 516 (1951);
Brooks v. State, 28 Neb. 389, 44 N.W. 436 (1889); Gettinger v. State,
13 Neb. 308, 14 N.W. 403 (1882).

LEGISLATIVE NOTE

cency statute,30 which imposes a maximum penalty of five hundred dollars or six months imprisonment or both. In order for the
crime to fall within the grand larceny statute, the value of the
31
article stolen must be worth one hundred dollars or more.
The Nebraska act is directed toward resolving both of the
aforementioned problems. 32 The act sets out an extensive definition of trade secret and requires only that the article stolen be
of value in order for the theft to be classified as a felony. The
definition makes clear that a copy, photograph or even a scrap of
paper, if representative of a trade secret, is sufficient to meet the
requisite property requirement for conviction. Prior to its passage, theft of a trade secret in Nebraska would generally be classified as a petit larceny offense. 33 By requiring the article to be
merely of value rather than a fixed or minimum sum, in order to
determine degree, the theft of a trade secret is punishable as a
felony.
The proponents of the Nebraska act felt that the penalty
provision would act as a strong deterrent to future trade secret
thefts.34 Criminal convictions attract more attention than do civil
judgments, as civil actions very seldom "make the front page" in
our newspapers. Therefore, a conviction for a felony would attract more publicity and would serve as a warning to others contemplating the theft of trade secrets. The individuals involved in
most trade secret cases are not typical mobsters, but are welleducated white collar workers and executives. United Press International reported a case in point:
Plump, balding Roberf Sancier Aries led a comfortable life.
Respected as a scientist, he was -listed in Who's Who. But then
a U.S. Drug firm realized that someone had stolen a $6 million
formula and peddled it around the world. Merck & Co. hurried
to Europe .... Late last year, a federal district judge pondered
the evidence and ruled that Aries, holder of two Ph.D. degrees,
high honors graduate of Yale, former consultant to banks, corpo-

rations and, the U.S. Government, member of the New York

Academy of Science, the American Institute of Chemists and the
Westchester, N.Y. Country Club, had* stolen the formula for a
poultry disease from Merck.35
The potential monetary value of the secret to the thief is a key
NEE. REV.
31 NEB. REV.
30

STAT.

STAT.

§ 28-512 (Reissue 1964).
§ 28-506 (Reissue 1964).

1965 Hearings 1.
Ibid.
34 1965 Hearings.
35 The Sunday Oregonian, March 28, 1965, p. 16, col. 1.
32
33
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factor in negating the deterrent effect, if any, in criminal sanctions. An individual in Dallas was not deterred by a possible
ten-year sentence when he stole computer programs from Texas
Instruments, Inc. The computer programs, which the company
had difficulty establishing a fifty dollar value for prosecution
purposes, were offered to Texaco, Inc. for five million dollars.86
The Nebraska act does overcome the problem of determining
value and property interest, but seemingly does not cover many
acts of industrial espionage. It requires physical removal of an
"article" in order to come within the statute's purview.3 7 An
industrial spy, who physically removes nothing but gains vast
knowledge of the competitor's organization and operation, would
be outside of the act. For example, a janitor who is actually a
technical expert planted in a competitive firm, telephoning information out at night without physically removing property would
be outside the scope of the act. There are other instances which
present more difficult questions, such as the purchasing of waste
paper from a company's custodial help or from garbage collectors
and later fitting the scraps of information together like a puzzle.
Problems are also raised when key employees are pirated away
by competitive firms. A 1959 survey of 1,558 executives by the
Harvard Business Review 38 revealed some alarming trends in
business ethics. The report indicated that twelve percent of corporate executives reported that their respective companies received competitive information through the hiring of competitor's
employees. Over seventy-eight percent of these executives felt
their companies were entitled to all abilities and key knowledge
possessed by the new employees. Companies avoid prosecuting
employees who are discovered to be thieves, because the companies do not want bad publicity nor do they want to risk a damage
suit if the alleged thief is not convicted. As a consequence, fear
of prosecution is diminished because the employee is aware of the
39
company's reluctance to prosecute.
This is a difficult area in which to legislatively protect the
employer because there are equally important policy reasons for
protecting the mobility of the labor force. Perhaps it is best to
leave the problem of employee disclosure to the private contrac40
tual relationship of employee-employer.
36 State v. Hancock, No. E-9167-IK, D. Tex., Sept. 3, 1965.
37 Supra notes 30 and 31.
38 Business Week, Nov. 21, 1959, p. 114.
39 BRENTON,

40

THE PRIVAcY

INVADERS,

97 (1964).

This would be so, as long as the employee did not fall within the
purview of the Nebraska act, i.e., physically removing "articles" rep-

LEGISLATIVE NOTE
IV. UNIFORM LEGISLATION
In recent years there have been attempts to draft uniform
legislation in the trade secret field. The Committee on Trademarks and Unfair Competition of the New York City Bar Asso41
ciation drafted a Federal Unfair Commercial Activities Act,
which included theft of trade secrets under the general heading
of unfair commercial activity. The act was introduced in Congress in 1959,42 but was never passed. The Judiciary Committee
is presently considering a bill which would prohibit the interstate
transportation of stolen trade secrets. 43 This provision would
amend the Stolen Property Act.44 The proposed draft is substantially similar to the Nebraska act.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Nebraska act will not provide complete protection for
an owner of a trade secret, but it certainly affords far greater
protection than was previously available. The bill negates many
of the hollow defenses formally used by industrial spys. No
longer will an accused have the defense that what he took was
only a copy or photograph and therefore was not property. Nor
can a person charged assert as a defense that the "article" has
been returned or that he intended to return it. Section three of
the Nebraska act specifically voids this defense. 45 The prosecution is no longer burdened with the often impossible task of
establishing fair market value of the article taken, as the act requires only that the article be "secret" and of "value". Although
the act should greatly aid the prosecution in obtaining convictions
in a majority of trade theft cases, more protection is needed.
There is need for comprehensive legislation which would cover
the individual who is placed in a competitive firm to remove
nothing but "ideas". The intent to "steal" and the injury to the
resenting trade secrets. The acts of the employee with regard to disclosure could and generally are included either expressly or impliedly

41
42

43

44
45

in contracts of employment. It is for the employer and employee to
establish the necessary protection for those acts which would fall outside the scope of the statutes.
Klein, The Technical Trade Secret Quadrangle: A Survey, 55 Nw.
U.L.REv. 437 (1960).
H.R. 7833, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
H.R. 5578, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). No hearings have been held
and none are scheduled. There appears to be no comparable proposal pending in the Senate.
18 U.S.C. §§ 2311-17 (1964).
Supra note 1.
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owner are equally as great under these circumstances as in the
case where the article itself is removed. Both state and federal
agencies are aware of the need for legislation in the trade theft
area 46 and if the recent interest is indicative of public concern,
the near future should experience more comprehensive legislation in this area.
Jeffrey L. Orr '67

46

Klein, supra note 41.

